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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

ERISA—ON THE EDGE OF EQUITY: CAN “APPROPRIATE
EQUITABLE RELIEF” BE CAPPED?

I. INTRODUCTION
A hardworking union laborer goes to a local establishment to get a drink.1
An intoxicated man pulls a knife and stabs him in the stomach.2 The resulting
injuries cause nearly $40,000 in medical treatment, lost wages, and disability.3
Because the attacker has been criminally prosecuted and has no assets, the only
viable recovery is a dramshop action under state law, which would provide for
compensation from the drinking establishment if it served the tortfeasor liquor
to the point of intoxication.4
Damages in dramshop actions are capped by state law at approximately
$40,000 and can be difficult to prove.5 The man has only a few hundred
dollars in out-of-pocket medical expenses that were not covered by his health
insurance and, due to his pain and suffering, lost wages, and disability, he

1. This introduction is based on the federal case Trustees of the Carpenters’ Health and
Welfare Trust Fund of St. Louis v. Brunkhorst, No. 05-382-DRH, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38107
(S.D. Ill. 2006).
2. Id. at *5 n.3.
3. Id. at *5, *7.
4. While a civil action could be brought against an incarcerated person with no assets, there
is a low likelihood that any judgment would be collectible. See Kauk v. Matthews, 426 N.E.2d
552, 555 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (explaining that only after assets or income of a judgment debtor
have been discovered may an Illinois court take action to execute and collect the judgment).
Because the applicable statute of limitations on any potential civil action for assault and battery
will likely expire prior to the termination of the incarceration period, it would be risky to file any
civil action against the tortfeasor in this situation. See Montague v. George J. London Mem’l
Hosp., 396 N.E.2d 1289, 1293 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (stating that a two-year statute of limitations
would govern a civil case for assault and battery in Illinois). Because civil assault and battery
cases are typically taken by attorneys on a contingency fee basis, there is no reasonable likelihood
that an attorney would bring such an action against an incarcerated individual with no assets. See
STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS 143–45 (7th ed.
2005).
5. Liquor Control Act of 1934 § 6-21, 235 ILL COMP. STAT. 5/6-21 (2006). See also
ILLINOIS STATE COMPTROLLER, DRAM SHOP LIABILITY LIMITS (2009), available at
http://www.ioc.state.il.us/ioc-pdf/Dram_Shop_Liability_2003_-_2009.pdf (presenting a yearly
schedule of liability limits in dramshop actions calculated by the Comptroller of the State of
Illinois pursuant to section 6-21(a) of the Liquor Control Act of 1934 in accordance with the
consumer price index-u (CPI-U) during the preceding 12-month calendar year).
527
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decides to hire an attorney who will proceed on the dramshop action for a
contingency fee. After discovery, it is revealed that the bartender on duty that
night could not be found and other witnesses are either equivocal or were
intoxicated, leaving the case difficult to prove. The attorney, therefore,
successfully negotiates a settlement for approximately half of the capped value
of the lawsuit.6 Because of the limited amount of funds recovered, the attorney
files a motion asking the state court to allocate the settlement.7 The court
enters an order dividing the settlement in the following way: $9,151.31 for
attorney’s fees and expenses; $6,282.90 to repay the health insurance
company; $200 to pay an outstanding medical bill; and $5,365.79 to the
injured party.8
After the case is settled, a letter from the health insurance company arrives
demanding reimbursement of the full settlement amount, pursuant to the terms
of the health plan which is governed by the Employment Retirement Income
Security Act [hereinafter “ERISA”].9 If the money is not paid, the insurance
company threatens to stop paying the family’s health insurance benefits until
the entire settlement amount is recovered.10 According to this letter, although
the insurance company has received $6,292.90, the man would still owe
$14,717.10, the remainder of his settlement that was previously distributed by
the court.11 In the letter, insurance plan provision is quoted:
As a condition of payment of any benefits to or on behalf of a Participant, and
to the extent of such benefits paid, the Fund shall be subrogated to all rights of
the Member against any individual, entity, organization or association for
damages on account of the injury or illness for which the Fund paid such
benefits.
In the event that a Member shall recover any amount from a third party, by
judgment, settlement or otherwise, for any act or omission causing an injury or
illness for which the Fund paid benefits, then:
a. The Member shall be obligated to immediately reimburse the Fund for
the full amount of such benefits paid, up to the full amount of recovery
undiminished by attorney’s fees or otherwise; and
b. The Fund shall have a lien on the gross recovery prior to all other
claims or liens including those for attorneys’ fees, in the amount
necessary to satisfy the Fund’s rights of subrogation and
reimbursement.

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Brunkhorst, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38107, at *5–*6.
Id. at *6–*7.
Id. at *7.
Id. at *5–*7.
Id. at *7.
Brunkhorst, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38107, at *7.
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In the event that a Member shall fail to reimburse the Fund for any of all
amounts due under this provision, the Trustees shall be entitled, in their
discretion, to suspend further payment of benefits to or for such Member
(whether or not related to the same claim), and to apply benefits otherwise
12
payable in satisfaction of the obligations of the member hereunder.

The injured man finds this provision unjust.13 He believes that he has been
working, paying health insurance premiums, and receiving health insurance
benefits as a condition of his employment. He does not understand why it is
fair for the health insurance company to take for itself the money he and his
attorney worked to create for everyone’s benefit. “Can they really keep the
entire benefit and deprive others of their share?” he wonders. Ultimately, the
court is unsympathetic to his plight and finds that the ERISA plan is entitled to
reimbursement of the the full amount of his settlement.14 The court even
allows the ERISA plan to terminate any further health insurance benefits until
the entire settlement amount is recouped.15 Although the court calls the
remedy provided to the insurance company “appropriate equitable relief,” it
makes no finding that the relief is appropriate and merely enforces the terms of
the ERISA plan as written.16
Employee benefit plans are a vital part of the compensation packages of
many employees.17 ERISA was enacted in 1974 to protect important
employment benefits, such as health insurance.18 In response to broad societal,
demographic, and economic trends, “the designs, features and types of benefits
provided by employer-sponsored plans have evolved” since Congress enacted
ERISA over thirty years ago.19 Employers have responded to rising costs in
health care “by replacing the traditional insured health care plan with health
care plans” that are “self-insured” by the employer or managed care plans.20
Although benefit plans have evolved to meet the changing needs of society,
“ERISA’s core statutory provisions that regulate employee benefit plans and
provide for enforcement remedies have remained remarkably consistent since
its enactment.”21 As a result, the federal courts “have struggled to apply

12. Id. at *13–*14.
13. Id. at *13–*15.
14. Id. at *24–*26.
15. Id. at *25.
16. Brunkhorst, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38107, at *25.
17. Colleen E. Medill, Resolving the Judicial Paradox of “Equitable” Relief Under ERISA
Section 502(a)(3), 39 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 827, 833 (2006).
18. Id. at 833–34.
19. Id. at 833.
20. Id. at 833–34.
21. Id. at 834.
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ERISA’s original statutory language to situations arising in today’s” legal
climate.22
ERISA provides for actions to obtain “appropriate equitable relief.”23 This
article discusses actions for appropriate equitable relief by ERISA benefit
plans for subrogation and reimbursement in cases where there are statutorily
limited or capped recoveries. Part II provides a summary of ERISA and its
purposes. Part III includes a discussion of the purposes of subrogation and
reimbursement in the context of ERISA. Part IV discusses the Supreme
Court’s evolving interpretation of the civil enforcement of “appropriate
equitable relief” under ERISA. Part V examines the conflict between the
policies of ERISA and the policies of state legislatures in limiting or capping
injury recoveries. Part VI analyzes equitable principles that should be
considered when dealing with the intersection of ERISA subrogation and
reimbursement claims against statutorily limited or capped recoveries. Part
VII will present arguments and make a call for judicial action in the form of a
changed interpretation of “appropriate equitable relief” under Section
502(a)(3) of ERISA.
II. THE PURPOSES OF ERISA
Congress enacted ERISA in 1974 to address the failure and
mismanagement of many employer-sponsored pension funds.24 Congress
determined that federal law should exclusively govern employee benefit
plans.25 Although originally intending only to regulate retirement plans,
Congress eventually extended ERISA to include all employee benefit plans,
including Medical Plans, Disability Plans, and Qualified Retirement Plans.26
This article will limit its analysis to Medical Plans [hereinafter referred to as
“plans”] that provide payments for medical costs that later become the subject
of a third party recovery by an injured employee.
Three core policies motivated the enactment of ERISA:
(1) to protect the rights of plan participants to the benefits promised to them
under the terms of the plan (the “benefit protection policy”); (2) to avoid
imposing undue administrative burden on employers that would financially
deter them from voluntarily sponsoring plans for their employees (the “cost

22. Medill, supra note 17, at 834.
23. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)
(2000).
24. Robert C. Sheres, Note, Setting the Stage for Creative Lawyering in ERISA
Reimbursement Actions, 31 NOVA L. REV. 187, 190 (2006). See also Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs.,
508 U.S. 248, 264 (1993).
25. Sheres, supra note 24, at 190–91.
26. Id. See also 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a) (stating that the Act “shall apply to any employee
benefit plan”).
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minimization policy”); and (3) to preserve the right of the employer as the
settlor of the plan to customize the design of the plan and the plan’s package of
benefits to the employer’s workforce and budget (the “settlor function
27
policy”).

While the benefit protection policy is superior to the cost-minimization and
settlor policies, the Supreme Court has noted the competing nature of these
goals, stating that there is a “tension between the primary [ERISA] goal of
benefiting employees and the subsidiary goal of containing . . . costs.”28
ERISA defines an “employee benefit plan” as “any plan, fund, or
program . . . established . . . by an employer . . . for the purpose of
providing . . . (A) medical, surgical or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in
the event of sickness, accident, disability, death or unemployment. . . .”29
“Participants” in employee benefit plans are defined to include employees or
former employees.30 A “beneficiary” is a person designated by the terms of
the plan or by the participant who is or may become entitled to a benefit under
the plan.31 A “fiduciary” is a person who has control over the plan or its
assets.32 Courts have interpreted the statutory concept of “fiduciary” broadly.33
The key factors considered are discretion, authority, or control over the plan or
its assets.34 The fiduciary is required to diligently “discharge his duties with
respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries” for
the exclusive purposes of: (1) providing benefits to participants and
beneficiaries and (2) defraying reasonable expenses of the plan, all in accord
with the plan documents.35 Once an employer has a program that is an ERISA
qualified “employee benefit plan,” the plan has access to the federal courts in
most controversies and has an existence apart from the employer, constituting
a separate legal entity that “may sue or be sued.”36

27. Medill, supra note 17, at 919.
28. Id. at 920. See also Mertens, 508 U.S. at 262–63.
29. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1).
30. § 1002(7).
31. § 1002(8).
32. § 1002(21).
33. Chicago Bd. Options Exchange, Inc. v. Conn. General Life Ins. Co., 713 F.2d 254, 250
(7th Cir. 1983).
34. Id.
35. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1).
36. § 1132(d)(1).
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Sections 51437 and 50238 of ERISA embody the goals of Congress.
Section 514 outlines ERISA’s preemptive effect on state laws.39 Section 502
outlines ERISA’s exclusive remedial scheme.40 Section 514, sometimes called
the “preemption clause,” provides that ERISA “shall supersede any and all
[s]tate laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee
benefit plan.”41 The statutory text of ERISA does not indicate how close a
relationship is required to satisfy the “relate to” language for ERISA
preemption; however, the Supreme Court has defined the phrase as having a
“broad preemptive meaning.”42 Section 514 effectuates complete federal
preemption, meaning that any action filed in state court may be removed to
federal court, even if a federal law violation is not pled.43 Section 502, the
“civil enforcement” provision, enumerates the exclusive remedies available in
ERISA actions by stating the following:
A civil action may be brought . . . by a participant, beneficiary or fiduciary (A)
to enjoin any act or practice which violated any provision of this subchapter or
the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to
redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or
44
the terms of the plan.

Appropriate equitable relief has been conclusively interpreted not to
include claims for punitive, consequential, compensatory, or other state
specific damages resulting from a breach of the benefits plan contract.45
However, the types of remedies embraced under the guise of ERISA’s
appropriate equitable relief have evolved due to three Supreme Court

37. § 1144. Section 514 of ERISA is also printed in the United States Code under Section
1144 and the two provisions are used interchangeably. See ERISA: THE LAW AND THE CODE §
2-107 (Michael G. Kushner & Karen Hsu eds., 1999).
38. 29 U.S.C. § 1132. Section 502 of ERISA is also printed in the United States Code under
Section 1132 and the provisions are used interchangeably. See ERISA: THE LAW AND THE
CODE, supra note 37, § 2-107.
39. 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (“provisions of this . . . chapter shall supersede any and all State laws
insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan described in . . . this title
and not exempt under . . . this title”).
40. 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (entitled “Civil enforcement”).
41. § 1144.
42. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47 (1987) (stating that the broad common
sense meaning of the phrase “relate to” means having “a connection with or reference to”).
43. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 64–65 (1987). See also Jass v. Prudential
Health Care Plan, Inc., 88 F.3d 1482, 1488–90 (7th Cir. 1996).
44. 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (emphasis added).
45. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 255 (1993) (noting that Section 502(a)(3)’s
provision for other appropriate equitable relief does not permit the recovery of consequential
damages). See also Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 144 (1985) (asserting that
the language of ERISA does not support “a private right of action for compensatory or punitive
relief”).
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decisions, discussed in Part IV.46 Because of this varied judicial interpretation,
the ability of ERISA plans to seek subrogation or reimbursement of medical
benefits paid from third party recoveries has changed dramatically. Part III
presents a background discussion of the purposes of subrogation and
reimbursement in the context of ERISA.
III. SUBROGATION AND REIMBURSEMENT
“Subrogation and reimbursement are related doctrines intended to prevent
unjust enrichment and injustice.”47 Subrogation “is a creature of equity; . . .
enforced solely for the purpose of accomplishing the ends of substantial
justice.”48 Subrogation has been referred to as “a species of spontaneous
agency.”49 Subrogation allows the subrogee (the ERISA plan) to stand in the
shoes of its subrogor (the insured participant) to recover benefits paid by the
plan.50 Subrogation transfers to the ERISA plan the participant’s right to
recover benefits from a third party.51
A plan’s subrogation rights must arise out of its contractual provisions.52
State judiciaries and legislatures disfavor enforcement of subrogation rights
“because it seems to violate the public policies against assigning personal
injury claims and the prohibition against splitting causes of action.”53 “To
avoid violating these public policies,” plans have “redesigned the language of
their contracts to grant them the right of reimbursement” as well as the right of
subrogation and have continually attempted to enforce these provisions.54
Reimbursement is distinct from subrogation in that it is a contractual right
contained in the plan allowing it to receive payment from a participant’s

46. See generally Sereboff v. Mid-Atlantic Med. Servs., Inc., 547 U.S. 356 (2006) (outlining
forms equitable relief that would allow an ERISA plan to achieve reimbursement of a member’s
tort recovery under the terms of its plan); Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534
U.S. 204 (2002) (drawing a sharp distinction between legal remedies and the equitable remedies
available under § 502(a)(3)); Mertens, 508 U.S. 248 (defining equitable relief as “something less
than all relief”).
47. Sheres, supra note 24, at 194.
48. Memphis & Little Rock R.R. Co. v. Dow, 120 U.S. 287, 301–02 (1887). See also
Standard Indus., Inc. v. Thompson, 152 N.E.2d 500, 501–03 (Ill. App. Ct. 1958); People ex. rel.
Nelson v. Philip State Bank & Trust Co., 30 N.E.2d 771, 773 (Ill. App. Ct. 1940).
49. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Petroleum Navigation Co., 35 F. Supp. 350, 351
(W.D. Wash. 1940) (quoting Durante v. Eannaco, 438, 72 N.Y.S. 1048, 1050 (N.Y. App. Div.
1901)).
50. Unisys Med. Plan v. Timm, 98 F.3d 971, 973 (7th Cir. 1996).
51. Id.
52. See Walker v. Rose, 22 F. Supp. 2d 343, 351 (D. N.J. 1998) (noting that ERISA “says
nothing” about subrogation or reimbursement requiring such provisions to arise from the terms of
the plan).
53. Sheres, supra note 24, at 194.
54. Id.
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recovery against a third party.55 “The effect of this redrafting was to create the
economic reality of subrogation . . . without its language.”56 A plan may
include either or both rights, and plan provisions often use the terms
interchangeably.57
ERISA does not require specific authority for a particular plan provision
due to the broad discretion given trustees.58 ”ERISA says nothing about
subrogation/reimbursement provisions.”59 Therefore, the Act does not
preclude an ERISA plan from enforcing a subrogation or reimbursement
provision contained in the plan against a participant. However, because
ERISA is silent on the matter of subrogation of benefits, federal common law
governs the enforcement of a welfare benefit plan’s subrogation
rights.60 Courts typically give full effect to the reimbursement language in a
plan, holding participants responsible for paying back a benefit plan pursuant
to the reimbursement provisions.61 Reimbursement is only required, however,
to the extent required by the terms of the plan. An ambiguous provision
purporting to create a right of reimbursement is construed against the drafter
and in accordance with the reasonable expectations of the participant.62
Accordingly, whatever rights a plan has to recovery are governed by the plan’s
written provisions.
The ability of ERISA plans to enforce subrogation and reimbursement
rights have hinged on the interpretation and application of Section 502, the
“civil enforcement” provision of ERISA.63 Section 502 enumerates that the
exclusive remedy available in ERISA actions to enforce terms of the plan are
actions for “appropriate equitable relief.”64 The ability of ERISA plans to
bring actions claiming reimbursement or subrogation for medical benefits paid

55. Timm, 98 F.3d at 973.
56. Sheres, supra note 24, at 194–95 (quoting Lee v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 129
Cal. Rptr. 271, 278 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976)).
57. See Cutting v. Jerome Foods, Inc., 993 F.2d 1293, 1297–99 (7th Cir. 1993).
58. See Chicago Bd. Options Exchange, Inc. v. Conn. General Life Ins. Co., 713 F.2d 254,
250 (7th Cir. 1983). See also Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §
1104(a)(1) (2000).
59. Walker v. Rose, 22 F. Supp. 2d 343, 351 (D. N.J. 1998).
60. See Cutting, 993 F.2d at 1296–97 (stating “[t]here is no doubt about the authority of the
federal courts to create common law for use in ERISA cases”).
61. Serembus ex rel. UIU Health & Welfare Fund v. Mathwig, 817 F. Supp. 1414, 1423
(E.D. Wis. 1992).
62. Bailey v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Virginia, 67 F.3d. 53, 57 (4th Cir. 1995);
Germany v. Operating Eng’rs Trust Fund of Washington, D.C., 789 F. Supp. 1165, 1169–70 (D.
D.C. 1992).
63. See generally Sereboff v. Mid-Atlantic Med. Servs., Inc., 547 U.S. 356 (2006); GreatWest Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002); Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508
U.S. 248, 264 (1993).
64. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2000).
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against a third party recovery by one of its members has dramatically changed
over the past thirty years in response to interpretation of Section 502 by the
United States Supreme Court.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT’S EVOLVING INTERPRETATION OF “APPROPRIATE
EQUITABLE RELIEF”
The Supreme Court has taken three opportunities to interpret the meaning
of “appropriate equitable relief” as used in Section 502(a)(3) of ERISA. First,
in Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, the Court addressed for the first time the
question of the types of remedies available under Section 502(a)(3), noting that
equitable relief designated by the statute is something less than all relief.65
Next, in Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Company v. Knudson, the Court
drew a sharp distinction between legal remedies and the equitable remedies
available under Section 502(a)(3), finding that if the action was one for
recovery of money, it was legal and could not be brought under ERISA’s
exclusive provision of equitable relief.66 Finally, in Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic
Medical Services, Inc., while the Court preserved the historical distinction
between legal and equitable remedies, the Court outlined equitable remedies
available that would allow a plan to achieve reimbursement and subrogation.67
A.

Mertens v. Hewitt Associates

In Mertens, the petitioners represented a class of former employees who
participated in the Kaiser Steel Retirement Plan, a pension plan that qualified
under ERISA.68 A class of former employees sued the plan’s actuary, Hewitt
Associates, under Section 502(a)(3).69 When the plan’s sponsor, Kaiser, began
to phase out its steelmaking operations—prompting a large number of plan
participants to opt for early retirement—Hewitt Associates did not change the
plan’s actuarial assumptions to reflect the additional costs of the increased
retirements.70 Plan assets eventually became insufficient to cover the benefit
obligations, and the plan participants sued for breach of fiduciary duty.71 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari only on the question of “whether ERISA
authorizes suits for money damages against nonfiduciaries who knowingly
participate in a fiduciary’s breach of fiduciary duty.”72

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Mertens, 508 U.S. at 258 n.8.
Knudson, 534 U.S. at 216, 218.
Sereboff, 547 U.S. at 361–63.
Mertens, 508 U.S. at 250.
Id. at 250–53.
Id. at 250.
Id.
Id. at 251.
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The plan participants maintained that the suit sought “appropriate equitable
relief” under Section 502(a)(3).73 The Supreme Court held that ERISA did not
authorize suits for money damages in such cases.74 The Court noted that the
plan participants were seeking money damages, amounting to nothing more
than compensatory damages.75 According to the Court, these compensatory
damages were a classic form of legal relief and not a form of equitable relief.76
Although the Court had not previously interpreted the phrase “appropriate
equitable relief,” the Court had construed similar language in Title VII to
preclude “awards for compensatory or punitive damages.”77 By looking to
Title VII for guidance in the ERISA context, the Court eschewed ERISA’s
roots in the common law of trusts.78 The Court acknowledged that equitable
relief could mean two things: (1) whatever relief a court of equity is
empowered to provide in the particular case at issue, or (2) those categories of
relief that were historically available in equity such as injunction, mandamus,
and restitution, but not compensatory damages.79 The Court chose the latter
more restrictive definition.80
According to the Court, reading equitable relief to mean “all remedies
available from a common law court of equity” would in no way limit the relief
available and would render an important modifier in the statute superfluous.81
The Court reasoned that “‘[e]quitable’ relief” as used in Section 502(a)(3)
“must mean something less than all relief.”82 The Court’s decision was based
on a strict textual reading of the statute, but was also policy driven. According
to Justice Scalia: “ERISA . . . defines ‘fiduciary’ not in terms of formal
trusteeship, but in functional terms of control and authority over the plan . . .
thus expanding the universe of persons subject to fiduciary duties—and to
damages—under § 409(a).”83 Thus, “[a]ll that ERISA has eliminated . . . is the
common law’s joint and several liability, for all direct and consequential
damages suffered by the plan, on the part of persons who had no real power to
control what the plan did.”84 According to Justice Scalia, exposure to this type
of liability would raise insurance costs for persons who regularly deal with

73. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 255 (emphasis in original).
74. Id. at 263.
75. Id. at 255.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 255 (citing United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 238 (1992)).
78. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 255, 257 (citing Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S.
101, 110–11 (1989)).
79. Id. at 255–56.
80. Id. at 257–58.
81. Id. at 258.
82. Id. at 258 n.8 (emphasis in original).
83. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 262 (emphasis in original).
84. Id.
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ERISA plans and, therefore, for ERISA plans themselves.85 Furthermore,
“[t]here is . . . a ‘tension between the primary [ERISA] goal of benefiting
employees and the subsidiary goal of containing pension costs.’”86 The Court,
in Justice Scalia’s words, would not attempt to adjust the balance that Congress
has struck between these competing goals.87
B.

Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Company v. Knudson

In a second attempt, Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Company v.
Knudson, the Supreme Court addressed the equitable remedy question in the
context of an ERISA reimbursement provision.88 Janette Knudson was
rendered quadriplegic as a result of a 1992 car accident. Janette was covered
by an ERISA plan.89 The plan covered $411,157.11 of Janette’s medical
expenses.90 The plan included a reimbursement provision, which provided that
the plan “shall have the right to recover from the [beneficiary] any payment for
benefits paid by the Plan that the beneficiary is entitled to recover from a third
party.”91 If a beneficiary recovered from a third party and failed to reimburse
the plan, the beneficiary was personally liable to the plan.92
The Knudsons eventually filed a tort action in state court, in which they
sought to recover from the manufacturer of the vehicle they were riding in at
the time of the accident, along with other tortfeasors.93 The parties negotiated
a $650,000 settlement and notice was sent to the plan.94 After judicial
allocation of the settlement,95 Janette only recovered $256,745.30 for her
debilitating injuries,96 which was allocated to a Special Needs Trust under
California law to provide for Janette’s medical care.97

85. Id.
86. Id. at 262–263 (quoting Alessi v. Rabestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 515 (1981)).
87. Id. at 263.
88. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 209 (2002).
89. Id. at 207.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Knudson, 534 U.S. at 207.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 207–08. The judicial allocation of the settlement proceeds was as follows:
$373,426 to attorney's fees and costs; $5,000 to reimburse the California Medicaid program; and
$13,828.70 to satisfy Great-West’s claim under the reimbursement provision of the Plan. GreatWest did not cash the check.
96. Id.
97. A special needs trust is designed to protect the government benefits of disabled people
who inherit property, settle claims, or win judgments. “In California, the term ‘special needs
trust’ generally refers to an irrevocable trust that gives the trustee discretion to supplement, but
not supplant, whatever is provided by government programs to the trust's beneficiary.” Terry M.
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The state court approved the settlement and directed the defendants to pay
the settlement amount directly to the Special Needs Trust and the remaining
amount to the Knudsons’ attorney.98 The attorney then tendered a check in the
amount of $13,828.70 to the plan for reimbursement.99 The plan never cashed
the check and instead filed suit in federal court seeking injunctive and
declaratory relief under ERISA Section 502(a)(3).100 The plan sought to
enforce the reimbursement provision requiring the Knudsons to pay the plan
$411,157.11 out of the proceeds recovered from the third parties.101
The district court granted summary judgment to the Knudsons, holding that
the plan only required reimbursement in the amount of $13,828.70, covering
past medical treatment.102 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court and
held that the judicially decreed reimbursement for payments made to a
beneficiary by a third party is not equitable relief and is thus not available
under Section 502(a)(3).103 The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the issue
of whether Section 502(a)(3) authorized the plan to take “this action” to
enforce a reimbursement provision of an ERISA plan.104 The Court held that
ERISA did not authorize the plan to seek restitution to obtain reimbursement
from Janette.105
The Supreme Court relied on the reasoning in Mertens “that Congress did
not intend to authorize other remedies that it simply forgot to incorporate
expressly.”106 The Court also reinforced the point that “equitable relief must
mean something less than all relief.”107 In the Court’s opinion, suits seeking to
compel the defendant to pay a sum of money to the plaintiff, whether by
judgment or injunction, almost invariably are suits for “money damages” or
legal relief.108 The Court stated that “not all relief falling under the rubric of
restitution is available in equity.”109 Although restitution was typically
available in equity, it was also available in certain cases at law.110 According

Magady, Something Special, L.A. LAW., Feb. 2002, at 26. The goal of a special needs trust is to
enable a disabled beneficiary to benefit from both the trust and the government programs. Id.
98. Knudson, 534 U.S. at 207–08.
99. Id. at 208.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 208–09.
103. Knudson, 534 U.S. at 209.
104. Id. at 206.
105. Id. at 221.
106. Id. at 209 (emphasis in original) (citing Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 254,
258 (1993)). The Court reiterated that the term equitable relief in Section 502(a)(3) must refer to
those categories of relief that were typically available in equity. Id.
107. Id. at 209 (emphasis in original).
108. Knudson, 534 U.S. at 210.
109. Id. at 212.
110. Id. at 206 (citing 1 DAN D. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 1.2, at 11 (2d ed. 1993)).
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to the majority opinion, whether or not restitution is equitable or legal depends
on the basis of the plaintiff’s claim and the nature of the remedies sought.111
In cases in which the plaintiff “could not assert title or right to possession
of particular property, but in which . . . he might be able to show just grounds
for recovering money to pay for some benefit the defendant had received from
him,” the plaintiff had a right to restitution, not in equity, but at law.112 In
contrast, a plaintiff could seek restitution in equity, ordinarily in the form of a
constructive trust or an equitable lien, where money or property identified as
belonging in good conscience to the plaintiff could clearly be traced to
particular funds or property in the defendant’s possession.113 “Thus, for an
action to lie in equity, the action generally must seek not to impose personal
liability on the defendant, but to restore to the plaintiff particular funds or
property in the defendant’s possession.”114
In the Knudson case, the plan sought the proceeds from the Knudsons’ tort
action, which were never in the possession of the Knudsons.115 The basis for
the claim was not that the Knudsons held particular funds that, in good
conscience, belonged to the plan, but that the plan was contractually entitled to
some funds for benefits that they conferred: “[t]he kind of restitution that [the
plan sought], therefore, is not equitable—the imposition of a constructive trust
or equitable lien on particular property—but legal—the imposition of personal
liability for the benefits that they conferred upon [the Knudsons].”116 Even
though the Court admitted that it had never “previously drawn this fine
distinction” of law and equity, the Court strictly construed the plain statutory
language.117 Thus, the plan was not entitled to this type of remedy under
ERISA.118
After Knudson, the circuits split over whether a fiduciary could enforce a
subrogation provision under Section 502(a)(3). The Fourth, Fifth, Seventh,
Eighth and Tenth Circuits decided that if a plaintiff’s request for
reimbursement under ERISA Section 502(a)(3) did not seek to impose
personal liability but instead sought relief (such as a constructive trust or
equitable lien) against identifiable funds in the actual or constructive
possession of the insured, the relief was equitable in nature and, therefore,

111.
112.
113.
1994)).
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at 213.
Id. at 214.
Knudson, 534 U.S. at 215 (quoting Reich v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 33 F.3d 754, 756 (7th Cir.
Id. at 214.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 214.
Knudson, 534 U.S. at 217–18.
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permitted under Section 502(a)(3).119 The Sixth and Ninth Circuits, by
contrast, found that any attempt by an insurer to enforce a subrogation or
reimbursement clause was a request that constituted legal relief and was not
available under ERISA.120
C. Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Medical Services
In its final interpretation of the equitable relief available under ERISA, the
Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit in Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Medical
Services, Inc.121 The Sereboffs received nearly $75,000 medical benefits from
MAMSI, an ERISA plan, following an automobile accident.122 They
subsequently recovered $750,000 in a personal injury verdict in state court
against the third party tortfeasors.123 MAMSI requested payment from the
Sereboffs and their attorney under the terms of the plan.124 The Sereboffs and
their attorney rejected MAMSI’s position and refused to reimburse the plan.125
Instead, the Sereboffs’ attorney “disbursed the funds to the Sereboffs and his
law firm, pursuant to their representation agreement in the California
litigation.”126 “The Sereboffs then placed the funds into their investment
accounts.”127 “When the Sereboffs failed to reimburse MAMSI for the
medical benefits it had paid, MAMSI sued, asserting that, as plan beneficiaries,

119. See Mid Atlantic Med. Servs., Inc. v. Sereboff, 407 F.3d 212, 217–21 (4th Cir. 2005)
(“We agree with the district court that, in this dispute, MAMSI's action seeks equitable
restitution, as that term is used in Knudson, because MAMSI seeks to recover funds that are
specifically identifiable, belong in good conscience to MAMSI, and are within the possession and
control of the Sereboffs.”), aff'd, 547 U.S. 356 (2006); N. Am. Coal Corp. v. Roth, 395 F.3d 916,
917 (8th Cir. 2005) (Plaintiff stated claims under Section 1132(a)(3) and the district court
properly imposed a constructive trust on overpaid benefits, permanently enjoined defendants from
disposing of or transferring funds in their possession and required tracing of funds no longer in
defendants' possession.); Admin. Comm. of the Wal-Mart Assocs. Health & Welfare Plan v.
Willard, 393 F.3d 1119, 1120, 1125 (10th Cir. 2004) (Action seeking injunction, declaration of
rights, constructive trust and equitable restitution was equitable in nature as in Knudson, even
though defendant never had disputed funds in his possession.); Bombardier Aerospace Employee
Welfare Benefits Plan v. Ferrer, Poirot & Wansbrough, 354 F.3d 348, 358 (5th Cir. 2003);
Admin. Comm. of the Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Assocs. Health & Welfare Plan v. Varco, 338 F.3d
680, 687–88 (7th Cir. 2003); Bauhaus USA, Inc. v. Copeland, 292 F.3d 439, 445 (5th Cir. 2002).
120. See Qualchoice, Inc. v. Rowland, 367 F.3d 638, 650 (6th Cir. 2004); Westaff (USA) Inc.
v. Arce, 298 F.3d 1164 (9th Cir. 2002).
121. Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Med. Servs., Inc., 547 U.S. 356, 369 (2006).
122. Mid Atlantic Med. Servs., LLC v. Sereboff, 407 F.3d 212, 214 (4th Cir. 2005).
123. Sereboff, 547 U.S. at 360.
124. Sereboff, 407 F.3d at 214–15.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 216.
127. Id.
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[the Sereboffs] had failed to comply with their subrogation obligations to
reimburse it for benefits paid on their behalf.”128
MAMSI sued under Section 502(a)(3) of ERISA.129 The district court
granted summary judgment, holding that MAMSI was “entitled to recover the
disputed proceeds under the terms of the Plan” and that MAMSI was indeed
seeking “equitable relief” under Section 502(a)(3).130 The Fourth Circuit
affirmed, holding that MAMSI’s action sought equitable restitution as the term
was used in Knudson because MAMSI sought to “recover funds that are
specifically identifiable, belong in good conscience to MAMSI, and are within
possession and control of the Sereboffs.”131 In essence, the Fourth Circuit
adopted the majority position stated above and specifically rejected the
minority position held by the Sixth and Ninth Circuits.132
The Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit.133 It first considered
whether the type of relief MAMSI sought was equitable or legal.134 The Court
determined that MAMSI sought an “equitable lien” which could be properly
characterized as equitable because the funds were specifically identifiable and
remained in the possession and control of the Sereboffs.135 The Court next
analyzed whether the basis for MAMSI’s claim was equitable, applying “the
familiar rul[e] of equity that a contract to convey a specific object even before
it is acquired will make the contractor a trustee as soon as he gets a title to the
thing.”136 The Court drew a parallel between MAMSI’s claim and that of an
equitable lien claim “of the sort epitomized by our decision in Barnes.”137
Barnes v. Alexander was a case decided by the Supreme Court in 1914.138
Barnes, an attorney, promised two other attorneys one-third of the contingency
fee he expected in a case.139 The Court found Barnes’ undertaking created a
lien upon the fee due to him from the client that “as soon as it was identified,
[the other attorneys] could follow it into the hands [of Barnes].”140 The Court
based its decision on “one of the familiar rules of equity that a contract to

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. at 214.
Sereboff, 407 F.3d at 214.
Id.
Id. at 218.
See supra Part VI.B.
Sereboff, 547 U.S. at 369.
Id. at 362.
Id. at 362–63.
Id. at 363–64 (quoting Barnes v. Alexander, 232 U.S. 117, 121 (1914)).
Id. at 368.
Barnes, 232 U.S. at 117.
Id. at 119.
Id. at 123.
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convey a specific object even before it is acquired will make the contractor a
trustee as soon as he gets a title to the thing.” 141
The Court reasoned that MAMSI’s plan provisions, like Barnes’ promise,
specifically identified a particular fund distinct from the Sereboffs’ general
assets and the particular share to which the plan was entitled. Thus, the plan
could rely on the familiar rule of equity to collect for the medical bills it had
paid by following a portion of the recovery into the Sereboffs’ hands as soon
as the settlement fund was identified and imposing on that portion of a
constructive trust or equitable lien.142 The Court found:
the “Acts of Third Parties” provision in the Sereboffs’ plan specifically
identified a particular fund, distinct from the Sereboffs’ general assets—”[a]ll
recoveries from a third party (whether by lawsuit, settlement, or otherwise)”—
and a particular share of that fund to which [MAMSI] was entitled—”that
143
portion of the total recovery which is due [MAMSI] for benefits paid.”

MAMSI therefore “could rely on a ‘familiar rul[e] of equity’ to collect for the
medical bills it had paid on the Sereboffs’ behalf”144 by following a portion of
the recovery into the hands of the Sereboffs as soon as the settlement fund was
identified and by imposing an equitable lien on that amount.145 The Court held
that the “strict tracing rules” that may have accompanied an action for
equitable restitution at common law do not apply to equitable liens imposed by
agreement or assignment.146 The Court effectively acknowledged that money
is fungible, so no “tracing” of money is needed.147
The Supreme Court clarified its holding in Knudson, noting that “[t]here
was no need in Knudson to catalog all the circumstances in which equitable
liens were available in equity; Great-West claimed a right to recover in
restitution, and the Court concluded only that equitable restitution was
unavailable because the funds sought were not in Knudson’s possession.”148 In
summary, the Supreme Court restricted any strict tracing requirement to claims
for equitable restitution and allowed MAMSI to seek an equitable lien on the
facts before the Court.149
After Sereboff, it is clear that a plan’s claim for reimbursement or
subrogation must be equitable and based on a claim for unjust enrichment
designed to enforce plan terms against identifiable property.150 The plan’s
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id. at 121.
Sereboff, 547 U.S. at 364.
Id.
Id. (citing Barnes, 232 U.S. at 121).
Id. at 364.
Id. at 365.
Sereboff, 547 U.S. at 365.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
See id. at 356.
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action to enforce payment was the same as equitable lien enforcement.151 The
plan could “follow a portion of the recovery” into Sereboff’s hands.152
Sereboff leaves some questions unanswered. While Sereboff preserved
Knudson’s historical vision of the dichotomy of law and equity, it is yet
unclear whether equitable defenses can be litigated.153 The Court commented
that, while equitable defenses to an equitable subrogation claim were
unavailable when a lien was created by agreement of the parties, the Court did
not completely foreclose the possibility of bringing equitable defenses or
conducting an inquiry to determine whether equitable relief is “appropriate.”154
If equitable defenses can be alleged, the most resounding call for such defenses
would be within the context of a capped recovery.
V. THE CONFLICT OF “APPROPRIATE EQUITABLE RELIEF” AND STATUTORILY
LIMITED OR CAPPED RECOVERY
While hidden behind the evolving reasoning of the Supreme Court as to
the meaning of appropriate equitable relief, one distinction remains clear when
examining the difference in the outcomes of Knudson and Sereboff. In
Knudson, a participant was rendered a quadraplegic and received only
$256,745.30 for her debilitating injuries, which was allocated to a Special
Needs Trust under California law to provide for future medical care.155 In
Sereboff, the recovery was much greater and the injured parties were able to
invest funds recovered from the tortfeasor.156 While one distinction in the
cases seem to be based on whether the injured parties actually received the
funds from the settlement, clearly the sympathies of the Court could have been
an important factor in the distinctions between these two decisions.
The dilemma in interpreting appropriate equitable relief develops when
there are not enough potential assets in the recovery to satisfy all obligations.
Subrogation and reimbursement of benefits advanced by a plan would be fairly
straightforward if participants suffering injuries at the hands of third parties
always recovered the amount of their actual medical expenses from the
tortfeasor in addition to compensation for lost wages, disability, future medical
care, pain and suffering, attorneys’ fees, and costs of litigation. The tort
system has been said to have two primary goals: “(1) to compensate persons
who are injured through the negligence of others; and (2) to deter future
negligent behavior,” both in the specific defendant and in others through the

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id. at 363.
Sereboff, 547 U.S. at 364.
Id. at 368.
Id. at 361.
Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 207–08 (2000).
Mid Atlantic Med. Servs., LLC v. Sereboff, 407 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2005).
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precedent created.157 However, today’s climate of capped damages in many
areas of recovery result in compromise settlements and verdicts that fail to
cover all damages.
Many states have enacted various forms of tort reform that limit recovery
for all torts or a limited number of specified torts, including medical
negligence cases, dramshop cases, nursing home negligence cases, and
products liability cases.158 All states have enacted state workers’ compensation
schemes that limit the potential for tort recovery by injured workers.159 When
ERISA collides with state statutory schemes that limit or cap the recovery of
injured persons, the result is truly not appropriate or equitable. To support this
conclusion, the examples of dramshop statutes and workers’ compensation
systems will be analyzed.
Dramshop. Dramshop liability has the primary goal of compensating
innocent third parties for the injuries they suffer when they are injured by
intoxicated tortfeasors.160 Dramshop statutes attempt to reallocate some of the
social cost of drinking from the drinkers themselves to the businesses that
profit from the sale of alcoholic beverages.161 Illinois162 has adopted a statute
that essentially amounts to strict liability when injuries are caused by the
intoxication of the dramshop’s patron, no matter what the circumstances of the
sale.163 Illinois, however, has limited the damages available in dramshop
actions.164 In 2007, Illinois placed absolute caps on the damages that
dramshops may be forced to pay at $56,302.45.165 Damage caps benefit
dramshops because they lessen the possibility that a single lawsuit will put the
dramshop out of business and make it easier for the dramshop to purchase
insurance to protect itself.166

157. Adam G. Winters, Where There’s Smoke, Is There Fire? An Empirical Analysis of the
Tort “Crisis” in Illinois, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 1347, 1349 (2007).
158. Robert S. Peck & Ned Miltenberg, Challenging the Constitutionality of Tort ‘Reform’, in
3 LITIGATING TORT CASES § 29.20 (2007).
159. Gwen Forté, Rethinking America’s Approach to Workplace Safety: A Model for
Advancing Safety Issues in the Chemical Industry, 53 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 513, 519–23 (2006).
160. Richard Smith, A Comparative Analysis of Dramshop Liability and a Proposal for
Uniform Legislation, 25 J. CORP. L. 553, 557 (2000).
161. Id. at 554.
162. The author chose the state of Illinois because it is the jurisdiction where the case
referenced in the introduction, Trustees of the Carpenters’ Health and Welfare Trust Fund of St.
Louis v. Brunkhorst, No. 05-382-DRH, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38107 at *1 (S.D. Ill. 2006), was
pending.
163. 235 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/6-21 (2006); Smith, supra note 160, at 557.
164. § 5/6-21.
165. See DRAM SHOP LIABILITY LIMITS, supra note 5.
166. Smith, supra note 160, at 573.
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However, damage caps lie in stark contrast to the primary goal of tort law,
to compensate victims who suffer harm due to the tortious conduct of others.167
When compensatory damages are limited, it severely undercuts the rationale of
the entire tort system, especially when the medical expenses arising from the
tortious conduct of a single drunk driver can easily exceed the damages cap,
the cap can render a dramshop action almost meaningless in the event of a
168
serious accident.

Recoveries are further reduced by the typical one-third contingency fees
charged by attorneys who prosecute these suits.169 It has been argued that
“having made the policy decision that dramshops may be liable in tort to third
parties for the improper service of alcohol, legislatures should not then remove
any chance for meaningful recovery by the most seriously injured victims of an
intoxicated customer.”170 What state legislatures, such as Illinois, probably
never considered in their decisions to cap dramshop damages was the impact
of ERISA as likely reducing—or completely obliterating—compensation of
those injured by intoxicated persons.
Workers’ Compensation. Employers who provide workers’ compensation
benefits enjoy immunity from suit by their employees for injuries arising out of
employment.171 Most state workers’ compensation statutes create a no-fault
compensation system.172 Negligence is irrelevant to the determination of
whether an employee is entitled to workers’ compensation benefits.173
Employees have a right to workers’ compensation benefits for work-related
injuries, regardless of fault.174
“The right to benefits and amount of benefits are based largely on a social
theory of providing support and preventing destitution, rather than settling
accounts between two individuals according to their personal deserts [sic] or
blame.”175 Employees sacrifice their rights to an action in tort and their ability
to collect damages for pain and suffering in exchange for prompt compensation
every time they sustain an injury during work.176 Unlike tort recovery, a
worker’s compensation system does not seek to return to the employee what he

167. Id.
168. Id.
169. See GILLERS, supra note 4, at 143–45.
170. Smith, supra note 160, at 573–74.
171. Forté, supra note 159, at 519–23. See also Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act, 820
ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/5-11 (1994).
172. § 305/2; ILLINOIS LAW AND PRACTICE, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION, 37 I.L.P.
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION § 2, at 216 (2007).
173. ARTHUR LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION § 2.10 (1989).
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1–2.
176. See generally Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 384 N.E.2d 353, 356–59 (Ill. 1978).
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has lost, but it enables the employee to live without burdening others.177 The
amount of compensation is often regarded as being not much higher than
necessary to keep the employee from destitution.178
For example, the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act [IWCA] prohibits
liens on recovery by providing that no workers’ compensation “payment,
claim, award or decision shall be subject to any lien.”179 However, courts have
held that ERISA preempts this state law.180 As a result, an injured worker’s
limited compensation can be claimed by an ERISA plan through a
reimbursement or subrogation provision, thereby frustrating the entire purpose
of the legislature in enacting the workers’ compensation scheme.
Policy Considerations. Cases of statutorily capped or limited recovery by
state legislatures make clear the need for equitable relief to protect the
recoveries of an injured person. It is unlikely that state legislatures take into
consideration the preemptive effect of ERISA when enacting damage caps or
statutorily limiting recovery through systems such as workers’
compensation.181 The policies of ERISA to protect the rights of plan
participants to the health and welfare benefits promised to them by the terms of
the plan received through their employment182 are also consistent with the
policies of state legislatures that attempt to ensure that, while an employee is
compensated for injury by intoxicated persons183 or while at work,184 business
owners’ economic interests are protected. Each legislative policy seeks a
compromise to benefit both the business and the injured party by seeking to
ensure business is economically feasible without denying compensation to
injured persons. However, when statutorily capped or limited recoveries
intersect with the doctrine of the complete preemption of ERISA requiring an
employee to reimburse the plan the entire amount of the limited or capped
recovery, these policies are entirely at odds.
The problem for plans and their participants becomes universal in that
overpayments increase plan costs and reduce funds unnecessarily. Injuries
caused by third parties often involve large amounts of money and put plan
assets at stake. While the settling participant may not have much incentive to
preserve the plan’s assets, other participants lose when the plan makes an

177. LARSON, supra note 173, at § 2.05. See also ILLINOIS LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note
172.
178. LARSON, supra note 173, at § 2.05.
179. Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act, 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/2-1 (1994).
180. Health Cost Controls v. Manetas, No. 94 C 00419, 1995 WL 66383 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
181. See, e.g., 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/2-1. The Illinois state legislature attempted to
prevent any liens from affecting workers’ compensation coverage, indicating that ERISA
preemption was not intended nor was likely considered. Id.
182. Medill, supra note 17, at 919.
183. Smith, supra note 160, at 557.
184. LARSON, supra note 173, at § 2.05.
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overpayment.185 The plan’s claims against participants to enforce the terms of
the plan implicate all three core ERISA policies. All of the participants are
subject to the terms of the plan. The plan terms dictate the benefits that each
individual participant in the plan is entitled to receive. If an individual
participant receives a greater benefit amount than is permitted under the terms
of the plan, the administrator must have the ability to enforce the plan’s terms
and recoup the excess benefit amount. If the plan is unable to effectively
enforce its terms, ultimately the plan’s ability to pay the benefits promised to
the other participants may be financially compromised. Lack of effective
enforcement of the plan’s terms undermines the employer’s ability to
accurately estimate the costs of the plan’s benefits and design a benefit
structure that is affordable to the employer.186
For a plan to receive reimbursement, action must be taken to establish
liability against the tortfeasor. In the absence of action by the injured
participant, the plan would be required to exercise its subrogation rights by
filing a lawsuit against the tortfeasor on behalf of the injured participant.187
Such action would involve coordinating the cooperation of the participant,
hiring counsel to prosecute the lawsuit, paying the costs of litigation, and
bearing the risks associated with the litigation.188 Failure of the plan to act on
its own behalf would result in the plan remaining responsible for payment of
the participants’ medical costs associated with the injury without
reimbursement. While it is unclear how often an ERISA plan exercises its
subrogation rights to file suit on behalf of injured members against third
parties, it appears unlikely that it would do so in light of the risk involved. As
long as the plan documents are strictly enforced without any consideration for
the appropriateness of the equitable relief, it would not be logical for the plan
to choose to pursue litigation at its own cost when it can successfully contract
those costs away to its injured members.189
When the injured member independently employs an attorney to achieve
recovery against the tortfeasor and allocate responsibility, such action furthers
the goals of society to deter future negligent behavior in the tortfeasor and
others and to compensate injured persons.190 While the action of the injured
participant to hold the tortfeasor responsible benefits himself, the community,
and the plan, the current conflict between the federal law of ERISA and state
statutory schemes capping or limiting damages dampens any motive to take

185. Medill, supra note 17, at 923–24.
186. Id.
187. See, e.g., Trs. of the Carpenters’ Health and Welfare Trust Fund of St. Louis v.
Brunkhorst, No. 05-382-DRH, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38107, at *13–*15 (S.D. Ill. 2006).
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Winters, supra note 157, at 1349.
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such action. When recovery is limited or insufficient, the current interpretation
of appropriate equitable relief under ERISA allows the plan to retain the entire
benefit, without even relieving the participant of the costs of litigation or his
attorneys’ fees.191 In such a state, most injured participants would conclude
that it is not feasible to take any action against the tortfeasor, because the net
result is only the injured member’s ultimate responsibility for the attorneys’
fees and costs of pursuing the action or termination of health benefits in order
for the ERISA plan to recover these costs.192
In the case presented in the beginning of the article, the injured party and
his attorney took a risky cause of action and attempted to establish liability
against a drinking establishment that allowed a person to become intoxicated,
creating a hazardous and violent situation for its patrons. Because liability was
capped and the lawsuit was difficult to prove, only a limited recovery was
available. However, the attorney and the injured participant appealed to the
state court where the action was pending to allocate the settlement fund to the
proper parties.193 Neither the attorney nor injured participant was seeking a
windfall or to avoid the obligations of the plan. Under the allocation by the
state court, no party recovered completely, but each party received
compensation.194 However, instead of accepting partial reimbursement, the
plan proceeded to sue the injured participant and threatened to withhold his
family’s health insurance benefits.195 Although the plan was willing to spend
its assets to litigate against the injured particpant, it was not willing to share in
the participant’s attorneys’ fees that resulted in the availability of the funds.196
The court incorrectly deemed that this result was “appropriate.”197
Currently, ERISA harshly enforces the terms of a plan without any
balancing of the appropriate equities. In the absence of a clear, contractual
provision to the contrary, an insured must be made whole before a plan can
enforce its right to subrogation. However, many ERISA plans require that the
plan reimburse all expenses without regard for the make-whole doctrine, even
renouncing litigation costs and attorneys’ fees for the recovery of the fund.198
When subrogation and reimbursement provisions are clear, the federal
common law holds that a court’s ability to fashion remedies is limited, and it is
inappropriate for a court to fashion a common law remedy that contravenes the
unambiguous subrogation provisions of a plan.199 When the plan’s provision
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

See, e.g., Brunkhorst, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38107, at *13–*15.
Id.
Id. at *6–*7.
Id. at *7.
Id.
Brunkhorst, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38107, at *7.
Id. at *24–*26.
Marshall v. Employer’s Health Ins. Co., 927 F. Supp. 1068, 1074–75 (M.D. Tenn. 1996).
Ryan v. Fed. Express Corp., 78 F.3d 123, 126–28 (3d Cir. 1996).
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requires complete reimbursement, even over attorney’s fees and costs of
litigation, the common law holds that it would be improper to allow an
obligated participant to deduct a proportionate share of the participant’s
attorney’s fees from reimbursement owed to the plan on the basis that the plan
would be “unjustly enriched” if it did not share in the participant’s recovery
expenses.200 The claim that ERISA’s core policies require the plan to be
responsible for a pro rata reduction of its reimbursement to offset the costs of
litigation has been rejected by some courts.201 If such blind enforcement of
plan provisions that require complete subrogation and reimbursement in cases
of limited or capped recovery continues, injured participants and their
attorneys will fail to bring actions against tortfeasors, dramshops, employers,
and others that cause harm to members of ERISA plans. Subsequently, ERISA
plans will stifle the social and economic benefits of the tort system by failing
to provide equitable provisions in plans. Courts should step in and award
appropriate equitable relief.
VI. PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY—CAN THEY SOLVE THE CONFLICT?
Equity is the “body of principles constituting what is fair and right.”202
“Equity is a way of looking at the administration of justice; it is a set of
effective and flexible remedies admirably adapted to the needs of a complex
society; it is a body of substantive rules.”203
In Sereboff, the participants argued that enforcement of the plan provision
would be inappropriate “without imposing various limitations” that would
apply to “truly equitable relief grounded in principles of subrogation.”204 The
Court focused on the Sereboffs’ claim that they would be allowed to bring
certain equitable defenses in an equitable subrogation action that would be
available regardless of the plan’s provisions.205 The Court held that the plan’s
claim was not “considered equitable because it is a subrogation claim”206 and
explained that the enforcement of the plan’s provisions qualified as an
“equitable remedy because it is indistinguishable from an action to enforce an
equitable lien established by agreement, of the sort epitomized by the Supreme
Court’s decision in Barnes.”207 The Court held that the equitable remedies
claimed by the Sereboffs, such as the make-whole doctrine, did not accompany
200. Id.
201. Id. See also Bollman Hat Co. v. Root, 112 F.3d 113, 116–17 (3d Cir. 1997).
202. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 247 (8th ed. 2004).
203. Zecharia Chafee, Foreword, to SELECTED ESSAYS ON EQUITY, iii (Edward Donenic, Re,
ed., 1955).
204. Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Med. Servs., Inc., 547 U.S. 356, 368 (2006) (quoting Reply
Brief for Petitioners at 5, No. 05-260).
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
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the plan’s action and were “beside the point.”208 The Sereboffs also claimed
that if the plan’s action was equitable under Section 502(a)(3), it was not
“appropriate.”209 The Supreme Court refused to hear this argument because it
was not considered by the court below.210
There are several important considerations embodied in this reasoning
from Sereboff. First, it is clear that the Supreme Court did not consider
whether, how, or if the modifier “appropriate” in the statute would change its
decision in the context of an argument based in equity.211 Because this issue
has not been addressed, it remains an important consideration and a promising
possibility to adjust subrogation or reimbursement recoveries by ERISA plans
in cases where there is a statutorily limited or capped recovery. Second, it
characterized the plan’s claim as one for an equitable lien “of the sort
epitomized by our decision in Barnes.”212 Distinguishing Barnes assists in the
understanding of what potential equitable defenses may arise against the
enforcement of an ERISA reimbursement or subrogation provision.
The Supreme Court’s analogy between Barnes and the Sereboffs leaves
much food for thought. Initially, it must be noted that that the Court was
attempting to enforce an equitable trust or lien by agreement. In Barnes, that
agreement existed between attorneys who were equitably dividing the work
and risk of handling a case on a contingency fee.213 This lien by agreement
occurred at arm’s length between sophisticated parties who were fully
informed of the terms of the agreement.214 This type of agreement is distinct
from the typical agreement between an ERISA plan and its participants, where
ERISA plans are drafted by sophisticated parties and handed to employees who
simply accept the health coverage offered by their employers as a benefit of
employment.215
Additionally, the agreement in Barnes was supported by the principles of
equity. In Barnes, the Court noted that each party performed the obligations
required under the contract and were entitled to the benefits negotiated by the
contract.216 By contrast, an ERISA reimbursement provision requiring full

208. Id.
209. Sereboff, 547 U.S. at 368 n.2.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 358.
212. Id.
213. Barnes v. Alexander, 232 U.S. 117, 119–20 (1914).
214. Id.
215. See, e.g., Germany v. Operating Eng’rs Trust Fund of Washington, D.C., 789 F. Supp.
1165, 1169 (D. D.C. 1992) (“Insurance policies are almost always drafted by specialists
employed by the insurer. In light of the drafters’ expertise and experience, the insurer should be
expected to set forth any limitations on its liability clearly enough for a common layperson to
understand.”).
216. Barnes, 232 U.S. at 121.
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reimbursement in a case where there is limited recovery and portions of the
recovery are for damages other than medical expenses, it is not clear that such
an agreement is equitable. Finally, the Barnes Court allowed the attorneys to
collect from the portion Barnes received as soon as the settlement fund was
identified and in his hands.217 The question in ERISA actions is: what is the
portion that is received by a participant that is identifiable and in his hands? In
the case discussed in the introduction, the injured member only collected
$21,000 for his knife wounds.218 Because this amount did not come close to
covering his lost wages, medical expenses, attorney’s fees and costs of
litigation, the money was deposited with the state court in which the action was
pending to adjudicate all claims and equitably allocate the money between
interested parties.219 Can it properly be said that the entire recovery could be
followed into the participant’s hands and be identified? Or is such a case more
similar to the case of Jeanette Knudson, whose recovery was deposited in a
Special Needs Trust and, thus, was not in her hands for the purposes of an
equitable remedy?220
Equitable considerations surrounding the ERISA agreement. Typically, a
party can defend against a contract that is unconscionable, oppressive, or
iniquitous. A contract may be treated as unconscionable when it is
improvedent, oppressive, or totally one-sided.221 Even where there is no actual
fraud, courts of equity will relieve against hard and unconscionable contracts
which have been procured by taking advantage of the condition,
circumstances, or necessity of the other parties.222 Factors relevant to finding a
contract unconscionable include gross disparity in the values exchanged or
gross inequality of the bargaining positions of parties, together with terms
unreasonably favorable to the stronger party.223 Courts will also look to such
factors as the age and education of the contracting parties, their commercial
experience, and whether the aggrieved party had a meaningful choice when
faced with unreasonably unfavorable terms.224
In ERISA actions, courts should consider the equitable defense of
unconscionability. When a third party is not held liable for a member’s

217. Id. at 123.
218. Trs. of the Carpenters’ Health and Welfare Trust Fund of St. Louis v. Brunkhorst, No.
05-382-DRH, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38107, at *5–*7 (S.D. Ill. 2006).
219. Id. at *6–*7.
220. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 207–08 (1993).
221. 8 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 18:10 (4th ed. 2008).
222. Id.
223. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 208, cmts. c, d (1981).
224. V. Woerner, Annotation, “Unconscionability” as Ground for Refusing Enforcement of
Contract for Sale of Goods or Agreement Collateral Thereto, 18 A.L.R.3d 1305, 1313–16 (1968).
See generally J. Fort, Understanding Unconscionability: Defining the Principle, 9 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 765 (1978).
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injuries, the ERISA insurer would be required to cover all of the member’s
medical costs under the terms of the health benefit plan. If a member decided
not to attempt recovery against a third party for causing the injuries, the
ERISA plan’s only recourse would be to assert its subrogation rights and file
the claim on behalf of the member at its own expense and risk. In both cases,
the ERISA plan would receive less than the full portion of the recovery.
However, when a member does take steps to financially recover for injuries
caused by a third party, any contract requiring an ERISA plan to retain all of
the benefit of the action by claiming reimbursement of the full recovery, with
no responsibility for the costs of procuring the recovery, is unconscionable.
Clearly, no member would agree in advance to take such measures on behalf of
the ERISA plan. Imagine if the injured member was given the following
options: (1) do nothing and your medical expenses are covered fully; (2) do
nothing, allow the ERISA plan sue on your behalf and bear its own litigation
costs, and your medical expenses will remain covered fully; or (3) spend time
and expend effort, hire your own attorney, collect a statutorily capped recovery
to reimburse the ERISA plan, and the result will be that you owe all of the
litigation fees and costs or will have your health insurance benefits cut off.
Members do not realize that these are their options.
In today’s climate of rising health care costs and difficulty procuring health
insurance, membership in an ERISA plan—probably the only option for
medical care coverage offered by the employer—is likely an employee’s only
choice for affordable health coverage. Because of the gross inequality of the
bargaining positions of the parties, together with terms unreasonably favorable
to the stronger party, no court awarding appropriate equitable relief should find
such a result conscionable, appropriate, or in line with public policy.
Equitable considerations surrounding the unjust enrichment of the plan in
cases of limited recovery. Unjust enrichment is the receipt of an economic
benefit under circumstances such that its retention without payment would
result in the unjust enrichment of one party at the expense of the other.225 An
argument exists that there has been unjust enrichment by both parties to an
ERISA plan. The plan can certainly make the argument that the participant
who retains any portion of a limited or insufficient tort recovery after the plan
has advanced medical benefits pursuant to a valid subrogation or
reimbursement provision has been unjustly enriched at the expense of the plan.
However, a participant who has independently hired an attorney at his own
expense and received an insufficient settlement allocated to cover a portion of
his damages can certainly make the argument that allowing the plan to receive
all of those funds without consideration for appropriate allocation of the
expenses and fees incurred in obtaining the funds has unjustly enriched itself at

225. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION § 1 (2000).
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the expense of the participant. Courts should attempt to resolve this issue by
allowing for partial reimbursement to ERISA plans in the case of a members’
capped or limited recovery.
Equitable considerations surrounding the imposition of a constructive trust
or lien on a fund that is in the participant’s hands. A constructive trust is a
restitutionary remedy used by a court of equity to compensate a party who
unfairly holds a property interest to convey that interest to another whom it
justly belongs.226 It is not a remedy for recovery or compensation under any
theory of contract law or tort but rather a restitutionary remedy that arises by
operation of law and is imposed by a court on equitable and public policy
grounds when a person holding money or property would profit by a wrong or
be unjustly enriched at the expense of another if he were permitted to retain
it.227 If a constructive trust or lien becomes available when an injured party
comes into possession of a fund for recovery, it is important to note that the
fund is usually held in the possession of his attorneys who also have a lien
imposed on the fund for an amount equal to their attorney’s fees and costs.228
Usually, an injured party only receives that portion of the fund that has already
been reduced by attorney’s fees and costs. Because the participant only ever
sees that portion, it is inequitable to allow the plan to claim reimbursement of
the entire amount according to the plan provisions. This seems at odds even
with the familiar rule of equity espoused by the Supreme Court in Sereboff.
Because Section 502(a)(3) prescribes that the civil enforcement of ERISA
plan terms by a fiduciary must be for “appropriate equitable relief,” it is only
logical that the judiciary allow participants to bring equitable defenses to plan
terms, acknowledging fully the import of the words of the statute and
employing all historical principles of equity, fairness, and justice.
VII. A CALL FOR A CHANGED JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF “APPROPRIATE
EQUITABLE RELIEF”
The judiciary needs to strike the appropriate balance between ERISA core
policy objectives and the objectives of states in enacting statutory caps on
recovery by applying Section 502(a)(3) as written, giving full meaning to the
words “appropriate equitable relief.”229 As the introductory case illustrates,
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Bishop v. Burgard, 764 N.E.2d 24, 30–34 (Ill. 2002).
229. In this article, the analysis has operated under the assumption that the injured party
would pay some portion the recovery to reimburse the plan, as occurred the introductory case.
See Trs. of the Carpenters’ Health and Welfare Trust Fund of St. Louis v. Brunkhorst, No. 05382-DRH, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38107, at *7 (S.D. Ill. 2006) (The plan was paid $6,282.90,
which represented one third of the net recovery, minus the plan’s pro rata share of attorneys’ fees
and costs.). However, it is important whether the member has clean hands. In Sereboff, this issue
seemed important because both the Sereboffs and the attorney ignored the plan’s attempts to
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each party can benefit when a capped recovery is allocated appropriately and
equitably among the interested parties. In that case, because there were not
enough funds recovered to satisfy obligations, the state court adjudicated the
matter and held that the injured party should receive approximately one-third
of the recovery for losses such as pain and suffering, lost wages, disability, and
out-of-pocket medical expenses, including co-pays and prescription payments,
also considering remaining outstanding medical bills that were not paid by the
ERISA plan.230 The attorney was found to be entitled to full payment of his
fees and the costs of litigation, split on a pro rata basis between the member
and the plan and paid by the two parties receiving a benefit from the fund he
successfully created.231 Finally, the plan received the remaining one-third of
the settlement fund with its contribution for attorneys’ fees and costs of
litigation.232 Such an outcome is both appropriate and equitable and should
have been enforced by the federal court.
When a court adjudicates the allocation of a partial or capped recovery in
an equitable and appropriate manner, it advances the interests of all parties
involved as well as the interests of society. First, with regard to the interests of
the ERISA plan, the three core objectives of ERISA would be met.233 The
benefit protection policy would be served by providing an incentive for injured
members and their attorneys to seek even a risky partial or capped recovery
from the third parties that caused the injuries by ensuring the receipt of an
equtibale portion of the recovery. The cost minimization policy would be met
because an appropriate equitable remedy would reduce litigation fees incurred
by the plan by distributing the litigation costs against third parties between it
and the member, thus creating an incentive for the member to take action and
the attorney to assume the risk of pursuing the cause of action by taking the
case for a contingency fee. Additionally, ERISA plans would find that such an
equitable distribution would result in it receiving a portion of the recovery
obtain any reimbursement according to the plan provisions in an action where there were clearly
enough funds and no applicable damage caps or statutory limiations. Mid Atlantic Med. Servs.,
Inc. v. Sereboff, 407 F.3d 212, 214–15 (4th Cir. 2005) (The Sereboffs refused to pay any portion
of their $750,000 tort recovery to reimburse the plan for the medical expenses paid by MAMSI
on their behalf in the amount of $75,000.).
Although not directly addressed in Sereboff, at least one court has held that it is not a violation of
ERISA for a plan to withhold health benefits to a plan participant after the participant has refused
to sign an early agreement to reimburse the fund. Alves v. Silverado Foods, Inc., 6 Fed. Appx.
694, 705 (10th Cir. 2001).
230. See Brunkhorst, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38107, at *7 (The injured member was paid
$5,365.79, which approximately represented one-third of the net recovery, minus his pro rata
share of attorneys’ fees and costs.).
231. Id. (The attorney was paid $9,151.31, representing “fees and expenses.”).
232. Id. (The plan was paid $6,282.90, which represented one-third of the net recovery, minus
the plan’s pro rata share of attorneys’ fees and costs.).
233. Medill, supra note 17, at 919.
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without having to litigate against its members to protect the fund’s
reimbursement rights. Finally, the settlor function policy would be served in
that, while the employer would still retain the benefits of customizing the
plan’s package of benefits to the employer’s workforce and budget, it would
preclude workers being subject to unconscionable plan provisions that result in
unjust enrichment and ultimately lead to unsatisfied, financially-disadvantaged
employees.
Second, attorneys who litigate against tortfeasors would benefit from a
court adjudication that allocates a partial or capped recovery in an equitable
and appropriate manner. Most attorneys agree to represent injured parties on a
contingency basis.234 This is beneficial to both attorneys and injured parties
who seek to redress injuries because it ensures that, when there is a recovery,
both the client and the attorney recover an appropriate percentage, making the
venture economically feasible.235 The attorney assumes the risk of the claim
only when there is a likelihood of reward. In cases of capped recovery, there is
less incentive for attorneys to take the cases on a contingency basis because
there is a statutory ceiling on the outcome of the case. The attorney’s incentive
is reduced further in cases where liability is difficult to prove because the
likelihood of a recovery profiting both attorney and client is even less
probable.236 Finally, if an ERISA plan seeks reimbursement of the entire
recovery, leaving the attorney to recover his contingency fee from a
disgruntled client who has received no portion of the funds, the attorney’s
incentive to assume the risk in this type of litigation is seriously diminished.
In the introductory case, while the attorney received payment from the
initial settlement recovery, he was left with a client owing his entire recovery
back to the ERISA plan and having his health insurance terminated so that the
ERISA plan could recover the fee the client had already paid to the attorney.237
In such a case, personal injury attorneys would be wise not to pursue any claim
where there is a statutorily capped recovery and medical expenses have been
paid by an ERISA plan that requires full reimbursement without any
appropriate, equitable allocation. However, if a judicial allocation split the
recovery between the ERISA plan and the injured member, requiring each
party to pay their pro rata share of attorney’s fees, the attorney can assure his
client of modest recovery and ensure the ERISA plan that it will receive an
equitable portion of the recovery at greatly reduced costs. Should the judiciary
interpret its enforcement of ERISA plans in this equitable manner, it will lead
to negotiations of equitable distributions of capped recoveries between injured

234. See, e.g., GILLERS, supra note 4, at 143–45. See also Illinois Workers’ Compensation
Act, 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/16a (1994).
235. GILLERS, supra note 4, at 143–45.
236. Id.
237. See Brunkhorst, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38107, at *24–26.
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workers, their attorneys, and the ERISA plan that will benefit all parties
involved.
While it is true that the ERISA plan might be able to obtain for itself the
entire recovery, less attorneys’ fees and costs, by subrogating its members’
interest in their legal claims, the coordination and costs of such lawsuits would
only result in meager financial benefit to the plan. Initially, the plan would
likely be required to coordinate with counsel in a variety of different
jurisdictions on a significant number of diverse lawsuits, which would result in
increased administration costs. The ERISA plan would further be required to
coordinate litigation between its retained counsel and the member. Although
the client is likely contractually bound by the plan terms to assist the pursuit of
the claim, the client’s lack of interest in the outcome may result in less
vigorous advocating of his claims. Once the claim was resolved, the plan
would still be required to pay its own attorneys’ fees and costs, plus the
additional administrative costs of coordination of the litigation efforts, likely
leaving it with less than the full reimbursement the plan requires of its
members. Therefore, while attorneys may be interested in pursuing such
claims on behalf of ERISA plans asserting subrogation interests, an appropriate
equitable allocation of capped recoveries creates more incentive for vigorous
representation in an efficient manner by fostering an attorney-client
relationship between the parties with the most incentive, leading to reduced
costs of litigation and increased efficiency.
Third, injured members would be benefited by court adjudication that
allocated a partial or capped recovery in an equitable and appropriate manner.
When members are injured by a tortfeasor, they have the most powerful
interest in seeking justice for the harm caused to them. By seeking out a local
attorney who specializes in prosecuting their specific type of claim and
attempting to maximize the recovery, the member serves the two primary goals
of the tort system by seeking compensation for injuries and deterring future
negligent behavior in both the defendant and others.238 Society has approved
of injured persons hiring attorneys on a contingency fee basis to encourage the
pursuit of personal injury lawsuits when it might not otherwise be financially
feasible.239 To that end, it is important that injured members of society
maintain an incentive to seek compensation and redress harms. If this
incentive is removed by ERISA plans that threaten members with no recovery
and ultimately responsibility for attorneys’ fees and costs, in addition to the
possible termination of their health benefits, it will discourage the pursuit of
legitimate injury claims. Such an outcome is not in the interests of the injured
members of ERISA plans or society as a whole.

238. Winters, supra note 157, at 1349.
239. See GILLERS, supra note 4, at 143–45.
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In conclusion, a call for judicial action is clear when ERISA plans
requiring full reimbursement of an entire recovery intersect with injury
recoveries that are limited or capped under state law. In such a case, the
judiciary should follow the plain language of Section 502(a)(3) and award
appropriate equitable relief. By considering equitable defenses to
unconscionable and unjust provisions in ERISA plans and giving full meaning
to the modifier “appropriate” within the statue, the judiciary can meet the
needs of society and each interested party to a capped or limited recovery. It is
recommended that the judiciary follow the pattern of the state court in the
introductory case by allocating an appropriate portion of the recovery between
the injured member, the attorney, and the ERISA plan, in line with the
principles of equity. The application of such an allocation would benefit all
interested parties and society as a whole. Should the judiciary fail to allow
equitable defenses to strict application of ERISA plan terms and fail to apply
the modifier “appropriate” to the equitable relief allowed in Section 502(a)(3),
there will be a breakdown of the purposes of ERISA and the policies of the tort
system, leaving injured workers who are members of an ERISA plan in debt
for attorneys’ fees and costs or without health insurance. The responsibility
rests with the judiciary not to blindly follow the terms of the ERISA plan in the
case of statutorily limited or capped recoveries, as illustrated in the
introductory case, but to allow equitable defenses and give full meaning to the
phrase “appropriate equitable relief.”
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